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I MUST STRAIGHT AWAY THANK Nimrod Aloni for the very generous things that he says 
about my book (see his review in this issue, pp. 209–214; see also Nicholas Maxwell, Global 
Philosophy: What Philosophy Ought to Be [Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, 2014]). In his 
enthusiasm for it, he does overstate its message a bit. I do indeed argue that academia 
devoted to the pursuit of knowledge suffers from a very damaging kind of structural 
irrationality, but I would never say, as Aloni suggests I do, that it is “completely irrational.” 
But Aloni's review is by no means all praise. At one point he says, “The book suffers 
from endless repetitions, self-referencing … and hardly any dialoguing with thinkers and 
philosophical traditions that have raised issues and arguments quite similar to those Maxwell 
raises in his book.” Oh dear. What can I say? 
It almost sounds as if I am completely self-obsessed, in a world of my own. It is not 
quite as bad as that. The index of what is quite a short book includes 149 people from a wide 
range of cultural and historical contexts: Aristotle, Samuel Beckett, Ingmar Bergman, 
Chekhov, Einstein, Condorcet, Kafka, Latour, Kant, D. H. Lawrence, George Orwell, 
Whitehead, Sartre, C. P. Snow, Bertrand Russell, Tolstoy — and many more. Nevertheless, 
Aloni may well have a point: I have not compared and contrasted sufficiently what I have to 
say with what some of my contemporaries have said. Instead of attempting to excuse and 
justify what may well be a failing of my book, let me rather provide an explanation. 
Over forty years ago, I made what seemed to me — and still seems to me — to be a 
profoundly important discovery. I spelled it out in a book called From Knowledge to Wisdom, 
published in 1984 (Nicholas Maxwell, From Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution for Science 
and the Humanities [London: Basil Blackwell, 1984]). It was widely and favorably reviewed at 
the time, and received a glowing review in Nature, in which the author said, “Maxwell is 
advocating nothing less than a revolution (based on reason, not on religious or Marxist 
doctrine) in our intellectual goals and methods of inquiry.… There are altogether too many 
symptoms of malaise in our science-based society for Nicholas Maxwell’s diagnosis to be 
ignored” (Christopher Longuet-Higgins, “For Goodness Sake,” Nature, vol. 312, 1984, p. 
204, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/from-knowledge-to-wisdom/reviews/#goodness). 
Alas, my diagnosis — and, much more important, my proposed prescription — has 
subsequently been ignored. Ever since, in publication after publication, I have tried to get my 
discovery better known but, aside from a scattering of individuals, I have failed. That is why I 
refer to my previous work: I am still laboring to communicate my discovery of long ago.  
And again I have failed. In his review, Aloni makes no mention of my discovery, even 
though it is expounded in Global Philosophy. What, then, did I discover?  
In a nutshell, it can be put like this. The current orthodox conception of science, taken 
for granted by scientists and nonscientists alike, is untenable. This holds that the basic 
intellectual aim of science is truth, the basic method being to accept theories solely on the 
basis of evidence, no thesis about the world being accepted permanently as a part of 
scientific knowledge independently of evidence. But this, I realized, is false. Physicists only 
ever accept unified theories, even though endlessly many empirically more successful 
disunified rivals can always be concocted — rivals that are never considered for a moment 
precisely because they are disunified. This means physics makes a big, permanent, highly 
problematic metaphysical assumption about the nature of the universe: it is such that all 
disunified theories are false, however empirically successful they may be. It is such that 
there is some kind of unified pattern of physical law running through all phenomena. This 
influential, highly problematic metaphysical assumption needs to be made explicit within 
physics, so that it can be critically assessed, so that alternatives can be developed and 
assessed, in an attempt to improve the specific assumption that is made. The aim of physics 
is not truth; it is rather truth presupposed to be unified — explanatory truth, in other words. 
We need a whole new conception of science — a new kind of science — that seeks to 
improve its problematic aims, and associated methods, as it proceeds.  
But that, I realized, is just the start. The aim of seeking explanatory truth is a special 
case of a more general and even more problematic aim of science: to discover valuable truth 
— truth that is either of intrinsic interest or significance, or truth that is useful for the 
attainment of other worthwhile aims. And science seeks valuable truth so that what is 
discovered will be used by people, culturally or practically, ideally to enhance the quality of 
human life. Science has even more problematic social or political aims. 
Then I had what seemed to me an immensely important idea. Just as Karl Popper 
had generalized his falsificationist conception of science to form a new conception of 
rationality, critical rationalism, which he went on to show has fruitful implications for a wide 
range of issues, so I could generalize my new conception of science (aim-oriented 
empiricism) to form a new conception of rationality, which I called aim-oriented rationality. 
This holds that whenever we have problematic aims — as we almost always do in personal, 
social, intellectual, and scientific life — we need to represent what we take to be our aims in 
the form of a hierarchy of aims, which become progressively less specific and problematic as 
we go up the hierarchy. In this way we create a framework of relatively unspecific, 
unproblematic aims and associated methods within which much more specific and 
problematic aims and methods may be improved as we act, as we live. All this is directly 
relevant to science. But above all it is relevant to the heartrending task: to make progress 
toward a good, civilized world. Such an aim is inherently and profoundly problematic. Here, 
above all, we need to put aim-oriented rationality into practice. Very specific implications for a 
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